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There is a body of international jurisprudence. When a case is
presented to an international tribunal, be it our own tribunal or any
ad hoc arbitration tribunal, the judge, the members of this tribunal,
draw constantly from the international jurisprudence, which while
not complete, is certainly very substantial.'
Horseplay and disease
are killing me by degrees
while the law looks the other way.2
I. INTRODUCTION 3
Tmor is an island 600 kilometers off the northwest tip of Austra-
lia and approximately 2,200 kilometers from Jakarta. It lies at the
eastern end of the Sunda Archipelago.4 In 1893 the island was divided
between the Netherlands and Portugal, with Holland incorporating
West Timor as part of the Dutch East Indies. West Timor became part
of the independent state of Indonesia when Indonesia gained its inde-
pendence from the Dutch in 1949. East T'mor remained a colony of
Portugal until 1975 when the Portuguese withdrew from the island. In
1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor5 and began an occupation marked
by brutality and terror and accompanied by a systematic degradation
1. GARRY STURGESS & PHILIP CHUBB, JUDGING THE VORLD 458 (1988) (quoting
Guy De Lacharriere, Vice-President, International Court of Justice (1985-87)).
2. Bob Dylan, Journey Through Dark Heat, STREET LEGAL, CBS Records, 1978.
3. This Article is concerned primarily with the history of East "rimor since 1975.
Early histories of East Timor can be read in the diverse literature on this subject. The best
of these are JOHN G. TAYLOR, INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR (1990); JILL JOLLIFFM,
EAST TIMOR (1978); JosE RAMos-HORTA, FUNU: THE UNFINISHED SAGA OF EAST TIMOR
(1987); J. DUNN, TIMOR: A PEOPLE BETRAYED (1983); HELEN HILL, THE TINIOR STORY
(1976). Some of the background to the East Timor issue is addressed in Report of the
Special Committee on the Situation in Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 23, U.N. Doc. A/10023IAdd.1 (1977).
4. East Timor consists of the eastern portion of the island as well as the enclave of
Oe-cussi, the Atauro Island, and the Jaco Islet. It totals approximately 19,000 square
kilometers.
5. Since 1960, East Timor has been a non-self-governing territory according to the
United Nations. Portugal was declared East Timor's Administering Power in 1960 under
General Assembly Resolution 1542. G.A. Res. 1542, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 30, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960). Portugal rejected this role until 1974, just before it
relinquished physical control over the island. However, Portugal remains East Timor's
official Administering Power under chapter 11 of the U.N. Charter even though de facto
authority is now exercised by the Indonesians. The political events leading up to the inva-
sion are described in Paul D. Elliot, The East Timor Dispute, 27 INT'L & Coip. L.Q. 238,
238-40 (1978).
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of East Tmorese cultural life.6 The United Nations Security Council
passed two resolutions condemning the invasion in 1976, and the
General Assembly passed a series of progressively diluted resolutions
between 1976 and 1982.1 Since then, international law9 and the world
community have, until recently, steadfastly looked the other way."'
This has occurred in the face of the repressive practices of the Indone-
sian military. Meanwhile, the efforts of East Timorese representatives
6. Figures vary but it is thought that between 100,000 and 200,000 East Timorese
have lost their lives as a consequence of the Indonesian occupation. See generally Human
Rights in East 7inor and the Question of the Use of U.S. Equipment by the Indonesian
Armed Forces: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Int'l Organizations and on Asian and
Pacific Aft. of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 1st S ss. § 1 (1977) (see
especially Testimony of Shepard Forman); Roger S. Clark, Does the Genocide Convention
Go Far Enough? Some Thoughts on the Nature of Criminal Genocide in the Contest of
Indonesia's Invasion of East -tunor, 8 Omo N.U. L RE-v. 321 (1981); S. Sidell, The United
States and the Genocide in East Thlnor, 11 J. Co-mrp. AsIA 44 (1981). -It is clear that the
people of East Timor have been denied the exercise of the most fundamental of human
rights under Indonesian rule." Human Rights and the Condition of the People of East 7-
mor, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Australia), at 84 (19S3).
7. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg., at 10, U.N. Doz. S~qNFh3l
(1975); S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1914th mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S1INFi32 (1976)
(United States abstained on this resolution).
8. See, eg., G.A. Res. 3485, 30 U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 118, U.N.
Doc. A/10634 (1975); GA. Res. 34140, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 206, U.N.
Doc. A134146 (1979); G.A. Res. 37130, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 227, U.N.
Doc. A137151 (1982). The resolutions became less damning because of intense Indonesian
lobbying, the eventual result of which was East Timor's complete removal from the agenda
after 1982. See generally RAMios-HoRTA, supra note 3, at 126-27.
9. There are some notable exceptions among international lawyers. See, e.g,, Roger
S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of East Tunor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Deter-
mination and Aggression, 7 YAIE J. WoRLD PuB. OmD. 2 (19S0); Thomas M. Franck &
Paul Hoffman, The Right to Self-determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. I-er'l L. &
POL 331 (1976).
10. The reasons for this neglect are not difficult to fathom. The United States had just
been defeated by the Vietcong in Southeast Asia and regarded the Indonesians as potential
allies in the region. Fretlin, the main East imorese resistance force, was organized along
Marxist lines and was therefore viewed with great suspicion by the Americans, The Aus-
tralian position is set out in the infamous telex sent in 1975 by the then Australian Ambas-
sador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, where he stated:
[W]e are all aware of the Australian Defense interest in the Portuguese Timor
situation.., but I wonder whether the Department has ascertained the interest of
the Minister of the Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation. It
would seem to me that this Department might well have an interest in closing the
present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more readily negoti-
ated with Indonesia than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor.
Quoted in Pat Walsh, Tunor Gap: Oil Poured on Bloodied Waters, 90 ARENA 12, 14 (199))
(emphasis added). It has even been suggested that the Indonesians were prepared to offer
Australia generous terms on boundary limitation in the Timor Gap in exchange for recog-
nition of the Indonesian invasion. See Michael Richardson, Ausm. FIrN. REV., Oct. 19,
1976, at Al.
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
at the United Nations and the hopeless but tenacious resistance of a
small band of guerrillas in the hills of East Timor remain virtually
unnoticed.1
Three recent events have transformed this situation. First, on No-
vember 12, 1991, a group of East Timorese youths gathered at the
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili to mourn a young Timorese killed in a
skirmish with the Indonesian authorities the previous month. Indone-
sian troops opened fire on the crowd killing hundreds."2 This was not
the first occasion on which force had been used against civilians in
East Timor, but it was the first time such an incident had been
filmed.' 3 The name "Dili" was thus to take its place alongside other
late twentieth century outrages like Tiananmen Square and
Sharpeville. 4
The second event occurred just over a year later with the capture
of East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao by the Indonesian
authorities. While apparently a success for the Indonesian intelli-
gence, Gusmao's capture brought in its wake increased media focus
on East Timor and a trial that has proved damaging to Indonesia's
credibility and public image.' 5 These circumstances provide some-
11. For a discussion of the work of the East Timorese delegation at the United Nations
see RAMos-HORTA, supra note 3. In recent years, Portugal and Indonesia have had peri-
odic discussions over the question of East Timor, but despite the encouragement of the
United Nations, these have been marked by intransigence and inflexibility. These discus-
sions have not involved East Timorese representatives. The most recent of these meetings
took place on April 21, 1993 in Rome. Few details are available of the meeting, though
there are reports that the two sides agreed on "confidence building measures." See Rome
Talks, MISSING PEACE, June 1993, at 4.
12. See, e.g., 15 Minutes to Death, MELBOURNE AGE, Nov. 16, 1991, at 1, 9. Casualty
figures vary. The Indonesian military initially put the figure at 19, but this was later revised
to 50 by an official inquiry conducted by Indonesian authorities. See Conclusions of the
Inquiry into The Dili Killings, MELBOURNE AGE, Dec. 28, 1991, at 8. Witnesses estimate
that upwards of 180 were killed that day, and there were reports of mass killings of eyewit-
nesses subsequent to the shootings. See Interparliamentary Human Rights Program, Joint
Letter from Members of the United States Congress and the Japanese Diet (1992) (released
by International Secretariat of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, on file with
author). Accounts of the killing are contained in TAPOL BULL., Dec. 1991, TiN1or LIN:
(London), Feb. 1992, and INSIDE INDONESIA [INSIDE INDON.], Dec. 1991.
13. Yorkshire Television's First Tuesday documentary team was in Dili at the time of
the massacre. See Max Stahl, 77mor Lacks Ally among the Mighty, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 15,
1992, at 12.
14. Canada and the Netherlands suspended their aid shortly after the massacre. See
Suharto Scoffs at Dili Sanctions, MELBOURNE AGE, Dec. 13, 1991, at 3.
15. See generally A Leading Asian Colonialist, WASH. PosT, Dec. 5, 1992, at A22. The
most recent available information indicates that following a finding of guilt and a life sen-
tence Mr. Gusmao had begun a'hunger strike. See Margaret Coles, U.K. Lied about Timor
Jail Visits, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 1993, at 10. The Red Cross is currently attempting to gain
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thing of a context for a third development that forms the subject mat-
ter of this Article. Briefly, the law will at last be forced to address the
East T'morese issue directly. In late 1994 the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J. or "Court") will deliver a judgment in a dispute be-
tween Portugal and Australia that has a direct bearing on the future of
East Timor. Portugal brought this case to the Court on February 22,
1991, claiming that Australia had infringed certain norms of interna-
tional law and breached Portugal's rights under the U.N. Charter and
customary international law.16 Specifically, Portugal has asserted that
Australia, in entering into the Timor Gap Treaty wvith Indonesia,17 has
infringed East Timor's right to self-determination and permanent sov-
ereignty over its natural resources,s and has infringed Portugal's
rights as the Administering Power of the territory of East Timor. This
Article will provide an analysis and evaluation of these Portuguese
claims and will consider possible Australian defenses. The Article will
also locate this dispute in the debate about the role and functional
limits of judicial dispute resolution in international law.
H. SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS ABOUT
THE CASE
In the Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Aust.),' the I.C.J.
will be obliged to consider certain embryonic norms of international
access to Mr. Gusmao. Xanana on Hunger Strike in Jail, Says Rebel Group, MELtOL.NE
AGE, May 28, 1993, at 11.
16. Portuguese Application, I.CJ. Doc. AIAC.10911072 (Feb 22, 1991). Portugal is the
administering power under U.N. Charter article 73. See G.A. Res. 1542, supra note S.
17. The Tmor Gap Treaty provides for joint exploration and utilization of hyrozar-
bon resources, by Australia and Indonesia, in the ocean between Australia and East Timor
and along the East Thnorese continental shelf This gap was left %hen the maritime
boundary between Indonesia and Australia was established in 1972. At that time EOSt
Timor was a Portuguese trust territory. The treaty came into effect in 1991. See generally
SAsHA S=AN, CREDIBILrTY GAP: THE TIMOR GAP AGREEMENT AND I'5 INTERNA.
T1o7,NAL IMPCATI O S (19S9); Sasha Stepan, Comment, Portugal's Action in the Interncr-
tional Court of Justice Against Australia Concerning the Tunor Gap Treaty, 18 MELBOURNE
U. L. REx,. 918 (1992); Andrew Mills, The Tunor Gap Trcaty, INSIDE INDOrn., Mar. 19O, at
5; Keith Suter, Oil in Troubled Waters, MARrnsn STUDIES, May-June 19S9, at 10 The
treaty text is contained in 29 I.L.M. 469 (1990). Australia has passed two pieces of legisla-
tion implementing the treaty domestically. These are the Petrolcum (Australha-Indonesia
Zone of Cooperation Act) Act (1990) and Petroleum (Australia-Indonesia Zone of Cooper-
ation) (Consequential Provisions) Act (1990).
18. See G.A. Res. 1S03, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. Al
5217 (1962).
19. Portugal submitted its memorial on November 18, 1991. Australia's counter-me-
morial was delivered on June 1, 1992. The subsequent procedure has been rezerved for
further decision by the International Court of Justice.
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law as well as those principles and rules that have been clarified
through long periods of state practice and judicial affirmation. The
Court will be confronted by a range of issues from the technically min-
ute to the politically inflammatory. In their decision-making, the
judges must weave a path that is partly defined by the Court's previ-
ous jurisprudence but also driven by a compulsion to satisfy certain
goals of world order. The manner in which these policy issues are
handled will determine the degree of success achieved by the Court in
enhancing its own standing, resolving the dispute, and construing the
law. Before considering these policy issues and embarking on the sub-
stantive questions, some preliminary remarks should be made. First,
most of the discussion here will concern the substantive features of the
case rather than the procedural matters facing the Court. Questions
of admissibility, jurisdiction, and standing are considered briefly but
do not form the substance of this Article. The merits of the case are
the predominant concern of this Article.20
Second, for those unfamiliar with the workings of the I.C.J. and
international law generally, it should be noted that the Court is not
bound by precedent. Under article 59 of the Statute of the I.C.J., no
doctrine of stare decisis operates and the Court is likely to look more
closely at customary international law than its own jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, the Court has in the past often adopted its own deci-
sions and no radical departures from previously enunciated rules and
principles should be anticipated.
The third point concerns the paucity of judicial decision-making
in many of those general areas of law at the frontier of international
law. These are the areas of law that remain, in Judge Lachariere's
words, "incomplete. ' '2 1 The Court will be determining some legal is-
sues for the first time, including for example, the specific rights and
duties of third parties towards groups possessing the right to self-de-
termination and the effect of unilateral recognition on prima facie ille-
gal situations. Other areas of the law, however, have developed quite
dramatically since the I.C.J. last considered them. Since Western Sa-
hara in 1975,22 which coincided with U.N. resolutions supporting East
Timor's right to self-determination, major upheavals in Eastern Eu-
rope and Eurasia have widened the potential application of the princi-
20. Australia has made no preliminary objections to the hearings, preferring to raise
its procedural concerns at the substantive phase (presumably) in order to expedite the
process.
21. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 1, at 458.
22. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
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ple of self-determination.P It is inevitable, too, that by the time the
question of trusteeship rights is considered in East 7imor, it will have
already been discussed at some length by the Court in the forthcoming
case, Certain Phosphate Lands.24 Indeed, some of the Australian ar-
guments in that case resemble the position it will adopt here in the
East Timor case. This is one of the small compensations in being a
regular defendant before the Court.
Australia's two appearances as a defendant state at the I.CJ. may
strike some observers as peculiar given Australia's apparent commit-
ment to the rule of law in international affairs. However, what these
cases and other I.C.J. decisions (delivered and pending) point to is an
expanded role for the Court in international legal dispute resolution.
Increasingly, the Court is being asked to develop international law as
well as restate it. In order to accomplish this, it has taken a more
activist, nonconsensualist approach to adjudication.2 The slide from
legal concreteness has been accompanied by the adoption of mediat-
ing and arbitral strategies. 26 With this general expansion has come a
debate about the Court's functional and political limits. The following
section discusses the ongoing debate about this role and attempts to
situate the East Timor case in this debate.
III. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: A FUNCTIONAL DILEMMA
The I.C.J.'s jurisdiction over states is dependent on states con-
senting to that jurisdiction either through acceptance of the optional
clause of the Statute of the I.C.J. (article 36(2)) or under particular
23. See Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Cur-
rent International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. IN'VL L. & Coai. 21 (1992).
24. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 345 (June 29);
Judgment on the Preliminary Objections, I.C.. Communique, No. 9218 (June 26, 1992)
(the Court found Nauru's application admissible) [hereinafter Phosphate Lands Jutdgmcnt
on the Preliminary Objections].
25. Phosphate Lands Judgment on the Preliminary Objections, supra note 24; see also
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 19S6 LCJ.
14 (June 27) (Merits); Mfilitary and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1984 .C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility).
26. For example, the reliance on "equitable principles" instead of concrete norms of
international law. This trend can be traced through several cases, notably North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46-47 (Feb. 20); Continental
Shelf (Tuis. v. Libya), 1982 LCJ. 18, 59 (Feb. 24); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
on the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246,303-12 (Oct. 12). For a general
analysis of the use of equity in these cases, see MA.trl Kosiur.I-4mE. Fro.z HErE TO
UTOPIA: THE STRuCruRE OF INERNATIONAL LErAL ARGu.ETrr (19S9).
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
treaty obligations.27 In theory, the Court's jurisdiction extends to any
aspect of international law. In practice, however, political factors
have often determined what matters are deemed justiciable by the
Court. There is a feeling at large among international lawyers and
diplomats that some issues are simply too political for resolution at
the I.C.J. These observers argue that the credibility of the Court is
threatened by the possibility of nonenforcement or judicial partiality
in such cases. 29 Worse, they argue, states may simply withdraw from
the Court's jurisdiction in sensitive cases. An infamous example of
this was the Reagan administration's decision that the U.S. govern-
ment's much-touted commitment to the rule of law did not extend as
far as a continuing appearance at the Court in the Nicaragua3" dispute
after the Court had found against the United States at the jurisdic-
tional phase.
31
These arguments all boil down to a fear that the Court could be-
come unworkably politicized by accepting jurisdiction in cases with
great political or strategic implications.32 It is fair to say that most of
the Court's obvious successes have been in relatively settled areas
such as disputes between states over issues including the limits of the
continental shelf or the precise location of territorial boundaries.33
The Court's irregular forays into contentious political disputes34 have
27. See, e.g., Iranian Application, I.C.J. Communique, No. 92/26, (Nov. 2, 1992). The
application was made under the 1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States,
This treaty vests jurisdiction in the I.C.J. should any disputes arise under the treaty. The
Court also has jurisdiction by special agreement under article 36(1) of the I.C.J. Statute.
28. The U.S. State Department explained its decision to withdraw acceptance of the
I.CJ.'s compulsory jurisdiction in the following terms: "Nicaragua sought to bring before
the Court political and security disputes that were never previously considered part of the
Court's mandate to resolve. In our view the Court's decision ... that Nicaragua's claims
were justiciable could not be supported as a matter of law." Abraham D. Soafer, Legal
Adviser Soafer Statement, DEP'T STATE BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67, 68.
29. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THI VORLD COURT (1986).
30. See generally, Soafer, supra note 28.
31. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 392.
32. The two examples most frequently cited are the decisions in Military and Paramili-
tary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 392, and the Nuclear Tests (Austl. v.
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20). In these cases the national interests of two major powers,
the United States and France, were at stake. Nicaragua concerned a use of force or act of
intervention by the United States, while Nuclear Tests involved French nuclear testing in
the South Pacific. These cases raised questions about the prudence of international adjudi-
cation over such sensitive matters.
33. Of course, these often are perceived by the parties as capable of resolution by the
I.CJ. This was a perception absent in Nicaragua and Nuclear Tests.
34. I mean here matters involving the vital national interests of states or conflicts that
are symptomatic of deeper ideological rifts. These can be contrasted with what might be
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often been attended by sharp academic criticism s (Nicaragua, Tehle-
ran Hostages3 6), withdrawal of jurisdiction (Nicaragua, Nuclear
Tests 7), or a loss of confidence in the Court among significant ele-
ments of the world community (South West Africa).-'
In some ways, this argument about function and politics encapsu-
lates the Australian position in East Timor. The Portuguese applica-
tion was described by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade in Canberra as "regrettable, misconceived and having no
basis in international law.''39 In short, it was an embarrassment to all
concerned. Dr. J.P. Fonteyne, an international law academic at the
Australian National University, adopted a variant of this argument in
a recently published article.4° In fact, the latter part of an othenvise
closely-argued assessment of East Tirnor is devoted entirely to distin-
guishing the moral and political issues involved in East Timor from
the legal questions raised by the case itself. On Fonteyne's reading,
Portugal has a formidable political grievance, while the East Timorese
possess exemplary moral rights. However, curiously, from a legal per-
spective, the Portuguese application is doomed to fail.41
Those who believe that law should reflect political and moral im-
peratives will be dismayed at this contrived separation between law
and morality. Furthermore, this formalistic distinction cannot be
maintained in the face of both the increasing tendency to ensure that
international law reflects the prevailing social and political currents in
the new world order and the continuing legalization of human rights
standards. Prominent among these human rights standards, of course,
is the right to self-determination. However one conceives of the dis-
pute in moral or political terms, the East Timorese, as is demonstrated
elsewhere, certainly do possess a legal right to self-determination. 2
called neighborly disputes such as those in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1S4 I.CJ. 246, and
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
35. For an example of this criticism, see Editorial Comment, Has The Intcrnationai
Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction?, SO Am. J. INT'L L. 12S (19S6).
36. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 19S0 I.CJ. 3 (May
24).
37. Nuclear Tests, 1974 LCJ. 253.
38. South West Africa (Eth. v. S.Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (Second
Phase).
39. Dep't of Foreign Aft and Trade (Austl.), Portugal's Action in the International
Court of Justice against Australia: Background, Aug. 1991 (on file with author).
40. Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Portuguese Timor Gap Litigation Before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice" A Brief Appraisal of Australia's Position, 45 Ausm. J. IT'L AFF.
170, 170-79 (1991).
41. Id. at 178-79.
42. See discussion infra subpart IV(B).
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In any event, states themselves are coming to regard the Court as
an ideal forum for dispute resolution even in instances where national
security interests are at stake. There are a record number of cases on
the Court's docket, and two recent applications illustrate the point
well. The Iranian government, already involved in the airbus dispute
with the United States,43 has recently brought an application regard-
ing the U.S. destruction of Iranian oil production complexes during
the Iran-Iraq war.44 Another application is from Hungary and con-
cerns Slovakia's proposed diversion of the Danube.45 Finally, there is
a trend at the I.C.J. towards greater admissibility of political cases ex-
emplified by the Nicaragua46 decisions.
These applications and the wider trends identified above are in-
dicative of a need for the I.C.J. to divest itself of the functional or
political limits within which it is, spuriously, regarded as operating.
As far as East Timor is concerned, in this era at least, the Court is
unlikely to eschew the opportunity to determine the complex legal
issues alive in the case simply because there is a strong political ele-
ment involved.47
IV. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS OF LAW
Self-determination is unquestionably a political issue. Perhaps
because of this it has lacked a definitive meaning in international law
for some years now. This lack of definitiveness has in turn threatened
the principle with obsolescence. Although the I.C.J. has invoked the
principle in some of its decisions, the Court has failed to arrest the
principle's slide into legal indeterminacy.
The I.C.J. has considered the issue of self-determination on sev-
eral occasions in the last twenty-five years. As noted above, while the
Court is not bound by precedent, by virtue of article 59 of its Statute,
43. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13); Aerial Inci-
dent of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1990 I.C.J. 86 (June 12).
44. Iranian Application, supra note 27.
45. Gabacikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. Communique, No. 93/
17, (July 5, 1993).
46. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 392.
The permanence of this trend is likely to be tested by the recent application from Bosnia-
Herzegovina concerning possible human rights abuses and use of force in the former Yugo-
slavia by the Serbs. Jurisdiction in this case is asserted on the basis of the 1948 Genocide
Convention article IX. See Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) Application, I.C.J. Commmunique, No. 93/4 (Mar. 22, 1993).
47. The most pressing political elements are Indonesia's control over the territory and
resources at issue and East Timor's enormous strategic significance in Southeast Asia (es-
pecially for Australia).
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it is likely to draw on its previous jurisprudence in this matter. The
three major elements of the analysis here concern respectively the
existence of the right to self-determination, the potential beneficiaries
of the right in international law,4s and the duties of third parties to-
wards a group claiming the right to self-determination.
A. The Existence of a Right to Self-Determination
The question of whether the right to self-determination exists in
international law is well-settled. The I.C.J. can refer confidently to its
previous decisions as well as to numerous U.N. declarations and
human rights treaties confirming the existence of a right to self-deter-
mination. 4 9 In the Namibia Advisory Opinion,0 where the I.CJ. first
considered the issue, the Court found that "the subsequent develop-
ment of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories,
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle
of self-determination applicable to all Nations."- This position was
subsequently fortified in Western Sahara, where Judge Dillard recog-
nized that "a norm of international law has emerged applicable to the
decolonization of those non-self-governing territories which are under
the aegis of the United Nations." 2
Unfortunately, in the very case in which the I.C.J. discussed self-
determination at greatest length, it arguably failed to advance the law.
The most quoted phrase from the case is Judge Dillard's reminder that
"it is for the people to decide the territory and not the territory the
48. Closely associated with this second point is the legal relationship batwecn a trurt
territory and an administering power no longer in physical possession of the territory This
is a matter of procedure rather than substance in that it goes to the standin of Portugal to
bring the case on behalf of East Tnor.
49. See eg., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 6. U.N. Doc. A/L323
(1960); G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doz. AJ46',4
(1960) (principles that should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation
exists to transmit the information called for under article 73(e) of the Charter); The Decla.
ration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co. pcratton
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, UN.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. AIS028 (1970) [hereinafter Dcclaratin
on Friendly Relations]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dee. 19, V1,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Riehts, Dee.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
50. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971
LCJ. 16 (June 21) (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion].
51. Id. at 31.
52. Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. at 121 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
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people."53 The epigrammatic appeal of this phrase is not matched by
its utility. Any attempt to apply it to a concrete situation reveals its
limitations immediately. It is unclear just how one would go about
applying this formula in Krajina or Bosnia. In Toynbee's pithy phrase,
"this is the statement of the problem not the solution. '54
In a more recent case, Frontier Dispute,5 the I.C.J. again had
cause to consider self-determination and, in particular, the relation-
ship of self-determination to the right of states to their territorial in-
tegrity. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the existence of a principle
of self-determination at international law, but again declined to sug-
gest limits on the exercise of such a right.
It is clear from these cases, reinforcing as they do a multitude of
U.N. instruments, that arguments concerning the status of the princi-
ple have been laid to rest. This is confirmed by the weight of state
practice during the period of decolonization when a billion people
were liberated under the banner of self-determination. However, if its
status is secure, the same cannot be said of the scope or potential ap-
plication of the principle. Particularly problematic is its relationship
to other principles of international law with which it may come into
conflict, such as the norm requiring the maintenance of states' territo-
rial integrity.5
6
However, the most complex issue of all, and one that must be
addressed next in relation to East Timor, can be encapsulated in one
of the most frequently asked questions in international law: Who is
entitled to exercise the right to self-determination?
B. Beneficiaries of the Right to Self-Determination
The question of beneficiaries or legitimate claimants to the right
of self-determination has been a thorny one for the international com-
munity since Woodrow Wilson coined the term during the post-World
War I reconstruction of Europe. The application of the principle has
been notoriously selective and occasionally ill-fated (Yugoslavia was
one of Wilson's early "successes"). Somewhat prophetically, Wilson's
Secretary of State Robert Lansing described self-determination as a
principle "loaded with dynamite.""7
53. Id. at 122.
54. Arnold J. Toynbee, Self-determination, 244 Q. Rav. 317 (1925).
55. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 556-57 (Dec. 22).
56. See discussion infra subpart IV(B)(1).
57. Quoted in LEE C. BucHHErr, SECESSION: THE LEoITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINA.
TION 66 (1978).
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Self-determination entered its most dynamic phase in the 1960s
and 1970s when it became associated exclusively with the process of
decolonization. 58 As colonial empires crumbled, the right to self-de-
termination ascended the normative scale in international law to the
point where it was ascribed peremptory status by the international
community5 9 However, when it became apparent that self-determi-
nation had become the favorite slogan of every self-respecting na-
tional liberation movement, the specter of disintegration and
secession was raised. The problem of definition has dogged self-deter-
mination ever since60 The apparent absurdity of denying self-deter-
mination to the Biafrans while invoking it for the Palestinians has
never been confronted. The most recent wave of self-determination
claims (successful and unsuccessful) from South Ossetia to Slovenia
and Quebec to Kazhakstan has served to reveal the ambiguity of the
ideal as a legal norm. Successive attempts to delimit the application of
the principle have in effect been exercises in damage control. Lan-
sing's dynamite has threatened to explode our very notions of state
sovereignty.
Given all this confusion it is fortunate for the I.C.J. that the ques-
tion of applicability in this case can be confined to East Timor itself.
The right claimed here is sui generis. There are complications, but
these can be considered in glorious isolation from revolutionary chaos
elsewhere in the world. A decision here may have few implications
for secessionist claims in Europe or the rest of Asia. In common with
most self-determination movements, but with significantly greater
legal justification, the East Timorese regard themselves as excep-
tional. In contrast to those of Slovenia, Quebec, Bougainville, and
countless other secessionist entities, East Timor's right to self-determi-
nation has been confirmed by the United Nations both as part of the
trusteeship process (it remains on the Decolonization Committee's
list) and in General Assembly resolutions passed following the Indo-
nesian invasion.6 In addition to this, the Security Council passed two
58. This process is documented in numerous studies on self-determination, notably, A.
RIGO-SUREDA, THE EvoLUrIoN OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATON: A SrUDY OF
UNITED NATIONS PRACrIC (1973), and W. OruATEY-KoDjor, THE Pprmc1ip. OF SELF-
DEER.PMNATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1975).
59. See LuRi HANNAXAINAN, PEREMPFTORY NORiS IN INTERNATIONAL Lxw 3M1-S4
(1988).
60. For a critical analysis of these efforts, see Cass, supra note 23, at 21-22.
61. G.A. Res. 3485, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 34140, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 37130, supra
note 8.
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resolutions on the Indonesian invasion re-asserting East Timor's right
to self-determination.
62
This is simply to say that the I.C.J. need not be constrained in its
decision-making by the possible implications for secession generally.
A decision here will have a somewhat limited application to the ques-
tion of self-determination generally. The right to self-determination
from colonial rule is a norm of jus cogens in international law. Its
existence is undisputed. Indeed, the problems associated with self-de-
termination are related to the extension of the principle beyond the
colonial context. Within the colonial context, its applicability has
been relatively incontrovertible. On the face of it, the East Timorese
issue falls squarely within this context. East Timor has been classified
as a non-self-governing territory by the United Nations.63 Regardless
of ambiguities in other areas of the law, one facet of the principle is
universally accepted, namely that non-self-governing peoples are enti-
tled to a right of self-determination.
The questions that need to be addressed by the I.C.J. then be-
come: Is this right qualified in any way by special circumstances (for
example, the passage of time or the existence of other countervailing
principles of international law), and what is the nature of the correla-
tive duty to this right of self-determination?
These problems in turn raise a number of procedural and histori-
cal questions. For example, does a right of self-determination, once
declared by the United Nations, continue indefinitely? Does the orig-
inal colonial state retain its rights as the administering power? Have
the East Timorese already exercised their right to self-determination
and chosen integration with Indonesia, as the Indonesians claim? To
further complicate matters, some writers have argued that East Timor
is merely a colonial enclave and that the Indonesians possess a right to
reabsorb a small area of territory that is geographically contiguous to
itf a' Finally, there is the principle of uti posseditis65 Does it have any
application to the present situation?
In discussing some of these issues I will propose three ways of
conceptualizing the East Timorese right to self-determination. In
62. S.C. Res. 384, supra note 7; S.C. Res. 389, supra note 7. Security Council resolu-
tions are binding under article 25 of the U.N. Charter.
63. G.A. Res. 1542, supra note 5.
64. See Fonteyne, supra note 40, at 176; contra JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 377-85 (1979) (East Timor is excluded from this category
of enclaves).
65. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.CJ. 556-67. The meaning of this term and the implica-
tions of the doctrine are explained below.
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what might be termed the classic colonial paradigm where a people
seeks self-determination from a European imperial power, the right to
self-determination is unconditional. It is evident that East Timor fell
squarely into this category in 1975. Nevertheless, the waters in the
East Timor case have been muddied by the replacement of the classic
colonial ruler (Portugal) wxith the regional imperium (Indonesia). This
raises several possibilities.
First, it could be concluded that East Timor's legal status could
not have undergone a change simply by virtue of its occupation by a
different alien power and that it remains a colony in the most restric-
tive and legally compelling sense. In this view, East Timor possesses a
right to self-determination that parallels that of Nigeria, Algeria, and
Mozambique during the 1950s and 1960s.
Alternatively, it might be argued that East Tmor is no longer
subject to "colonial rule" since Indonesia is not a colonial empire. In
legal terms, this would constitute a denial that East Timor was subject
to "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation."",b Accordingly,
East Timor would simply no longer possess a right to self-determina-
tion from colonial rule under customary international law (ex lata),
and that what in fact the East Timorese are claiming is a right to se-
cede from the Indonesian state. It is contended that this right is at
best a right de lege ferenda and is unlikely to be accepted by the I.CJ.
given the absence of supporting state practice and the frequently ex-
plicit condemnation of secession within the international
community.67
Finally, there is the intermediate position arguing that East Timor
retains a legitimate right or claim to self-determination, but that this
right must now be qualified by competing principles of international
law, notably Indonesia's claim to its territorial integrity.
To return to the first position, the contention that East Timor's
legal situation remains unchanged regardless of Indonesia's occupa-
tion is a powerful one. The United Nations and Security Council have
passed numerous resolutions affirming East Timor's right to self-de-
66. The classic statement of this type of self-determination can be found in the Decla-
ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Pcoples, G.A. Re, 1514,
supra note 49.
67. The most famous example of this attitude can be found in a speech given by the
then Secretary-General of the United Nations, U. Thant, during the Biafran crisis in Nige-
ria in the late 1960s. See M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-determination Beyond the Colonial
Contex=" Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 330-31 (1975).
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termination and condemning the Indonesian invasion.68 East Timor
continues to be regarded as a non-self-governing territory in the
United Nations, and Portugal is regarded as the administering power
for the purposes of Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter. Nevertheless, the
international community's attitude has been modified over the years.
While only a few states have recognized the Indonesian annexation
(Australia for one), many more states have tacitly recognized Indone-
sia's sovereignty over East Tmor. Whether these examples of realpo-
litik have been converted into a state practice possessing juridical
significance is open to question. 69 In addition, the most recent U.N.
General Assembly resolution affirming East Timor's right to self-de-
termination was in 1982.70 It has been argued that this indicates a
weakening of resolve on the issue and perhaps a recognition by the
international community that other principles of international law
have intervened with the passage of time. None of these arguments is
particularly compelling,71 but they serve to illustrate the complexities
of the issue.
Whatever is decided on the above questions, it would seem incon-
trovertible that East Timor possesses a right to self-determination of
some description and that this has legal implications greater than
those of a political claim to secession. The United Nations has never
accepted that East Timor is a secessionist dispute falling exclusively
within Indonesia's domestic jurisdiction under article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter. Therefore, the second argument outlined above must neces-
sarily fail.
72
This leaves the third possibility that East Timor's right to self-
determination has in some way been qualified by other principles of
international law. Judge Petren, in a separate opinion in Western Sa-
hara, stated that "a veritable law of decolonization is in the course of
taking shape .... [B]ut, in certain specific cases, one must equally
68. See generally G.A. Res. 3485, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 34/40, supra note 8; G.A.
Res. 37/30, supra note 8; S.C. Res. 384, supra note 7; S.C. Res. 389, supra note 7.
69. Most of the recognizing states have been motivated by economic self-interest (the
need to trade with Indonesia) or by the fear that their minorities might also agitate for
secession.
70. G.A. Res. 37/30, supra note 8.
71. See discussion infra subparts IV(B)(1), (2), (3).
72. It is probably the case that if the U.N. system is to operate in a meaningful way,
then there must be some method of distinguishing the two types of secession/self-
determination.
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take into account the principle of the national unity and integrity of
States."'73
The three most likely, though still improbable, counterweights to
the East Tmiorese right to self-determination are: Indonesia's right to
territorial integrity (or a variation of the principle of ti posseditis);
the proposition that East Timor represents an enclave at international
law; and the argument that East Timor belongs to Indonesia by virtue
of certain historical ties.74
1. Indonesia's Territorial Integrity and the Principle of Uti
Posseditis
Without doubt, the right of states to territorial integrity repre-
sents one of the fundamental norms of international law.75 However,
there are two conceptually discrete principles at work here. First,
there is the standard doctrine of state sovereignty enunciated at article
2(4) and 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. Each state within the
international legal system is entitled to an area of exclusive or reserve
73. Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 110 (separate opinion of Judge Petren).
74. The Indonesians also make two further arguments. First, they assert that the Eazt
Thnorese have already exercised self-determination and that the integration of East Timor
with Indonesia was in fact an expression of popular self-determination. Ali Alatas, the
present Indonesian foreign minister, argued this position forcefully at an address he gave
to the Press Club in Washington D.C. in 1992, where he stated:
Although the Indonesian people welcomed the expressed desire of the East
T'morese people for integration, the Government declared that it would not ac-
cede to it until after a proper exercise of the right of self-determination had baen
conducted. Hence, a provisional People's Assembly of East Timor was
formed .... In the capital city of Dill on May 31,1976, this Assembly, in a public
session... formally cast its vote to choose independence through integration %%ith
the Republic of Indonesia.
Ali Alatas, East Ttrnor: De-Bunking The Myths Around a Process of Decolonizaion, It;Do.
NEsIAN NEws, Mar. 20, 1992, at 1, 4. President Suharto himself has been quoted as sayin-
"It's the East Timorese themselves who chose to be independent together with Indoneia,
hence we could not reject their plea." Suharto: Timor Sought to Join Us, MELBOur,%r
AGE, Feb. 18, 1992, at 9 (emphasis added). Professor Roger Clark comprehensively dis-
poses of these arguments on the basis of historical evidence and U.N. practice and require-
ments in relation to acts of decolonization. Clark, supra note 9, at 12-18. Second, the
Indonesians argue that East Timor is part of Indonesia by virtue of its close pro.imity to
the Indonesian archipelago. This argument, sometimes called the right to rctrozession. has
virtually never been accepted by the United Nations or the world community, whether it
be raised by the Argentines in defense of their invasion of the Falklands in 198, or Iraq in
support of its claim to Kuwait in 1990. It is worth noting here that after the Dili massacre
Indonesian President Suharto made the remarkable claim that Indonesia never wanted
East Tunor in the first place. Suharto: Timor Sought to Join Us, supra.
75. See, eg., U.N. CrARER art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra
note 49.
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jurisdiction under article 2(7), and under article 2(4) no use of force is
permitted "against the territorial integrity or political independence"
of a state.
This specific right to the fruits of statehood is merely the state-
ment of a broader policy that informs the international legal system.
International law is an inherently conservative system of rules dedi-
cated to maintaining stability in the international order. The commit-
ment to the maintenance of borders and territorial stability is native to
the Charter system.76 Hence, the ambivalence towards the principle
of self-determination. The need to preserve the integrity of states has
proved a powerful counteracting force against the revolutionary and
secessionist urges of individual groups. Whatever the moral or polit-
ical claims of post-colonial self-determination movements, the law has
been resolute in its rejection of them. The names make for a tragic
and familiar litany to international lawyers working in this area: Kur-
distan, Tibet, Aceh, Southern Sudan, Biafra. In the particular case of
Biafra, the position of the international community was clarified in
1970 by U. Thant, the United Nations Secretary-General at the time,
who warned:
As far as the question of secession is ... concerned, the United
Nations' attitude is unequivocable [sic]. As an international organi-
zation, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a
part of its Member State."
This attitude was reflected in the prevarication surrounding the
recognition of the republics of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, new states have been recog-
nized. Arguably, a new right to self-determination has arisen outside
the colonial context, one that can be applied to entities as diverse as
Slovenia, Georgia, and Eritrea.78 East Timor's right to self-determi-
nation, of course, belongs to a different category from that of the un-
successful Biafran secession and the successful Slovenian
independence movement. In particular, its relationship to Indonesia's
territorial integrity is more complicated.
The I.C.J. has constantly reaffirmed the normative preeminence
of the right to territorial integrity in international law, most notably in
76. This explains the commitment shown by states towards I.CJ. adjudication in mat-
ters concerning border disputes and continental shelf delimitation.
77. Nayar, supra note 67, at 330.
78. See generally Cass, supra note 23, at 22-23.
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the Nicaragua decision. 79 The relationship of territorial integrity to
the principle of self-determination has also been explored. It is clear
that the right to self-determination in the colonial context cannot be
derogated from on the basis of a need to preserve territorial integrity.
For example, it is absurd to suggest that Angola had no right to self-
determination in 1970 on the grounds that its exercise would fracture
Portugal's territorial sovereignty.
However, Indonesia's claim to territorial integrity now may be
much stronger than was Portugal's in 1970 simply by virtue of its prox-
imity to East Timor and the fact that Indonesia is not a European
power. Indonesia does not possess the typical indicia of a colonial
power and so is often not recognized as such. Portugal was a classic
metropole, geographically distant and practicing the form of exploita-
tive colonialism distinctive to European powers. Indonesia, on the
other hand, is often regarded as a champion of self-assertion in the
developing world and a pathological enemy of imperialism. This has
resulted in a marked reluctance to describe Indonesia using the unflat-
tering dialect of anti-colonialism.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the principle of uti posseditis,
often associated with, and occasionally mistakenly thought to be sy-
nonymous with" the principle of territorial integrity, in fact directs
the I.C.J. to declare Indonesia's territorial integrity irrelevant in this
particular case. Utiposseditis is the principle, articulated by the I.CJ.
in Frontier Dispute,8 ' whereby states become independent within ex-
isting colonial boundaries. It is often used as an argument for preserv-
ing the integrity of the newly independent colonial unit from further
acts of self-determination, as in the case of the attempted secession of
Krajina from Croatia or, most notoriously, Biafra from Nigeria.
However, and this is the significant point for our purposes, the
principle yields a duty correlative to this right. Newly created states
are protected from secession, in return for, as Rosalyn Higgins puts it,
"forfeiting any historical claims they might aspire to regarding territo-
ries now held within the old colonial boundaries of others." 2
79. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 19S6 1.CJ. 40.
80. See Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in Pno.
CEEDINGS OF THE SECOND AmSTERDAm INTERNATIONAL LAw Co.--T-EEE-c o. Imr
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES AND MINoRrrms IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 n.53 (1992).
81. Frontier Dispute, 19S6 I.C.J. 662; see also K. Oellers-Frahm, Frontier Dispute Case,
(Burkina Faso v. Mali) in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBUC INTERNATONAL LAw 12, 122 (Ru-
dolf Bernhardt ed., 1990).
82. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination Commen-
tary on Professor Franck's Paper, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND A_ sTERDAM. lN"thmrUNA.
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So, while uti posseditis may be an ally to Indonesia in its argu-
ments against Aceh or Ambonese independence, it is wholly at odds
with its absorption of East Tnor into the Indonesian state. The prin-
ciple already affirmed by the I.C.J. in Frontier Dispute bars Indonesia,
a former Dutch colony, from laying claim to territories within the for-
mer Portuguese empire.
2. Enclaves in International Law
The arguments relating to enclaves and historical ties possess
more ingenuity than they do merit. Some international lawyers con-
tend that certain colonial entities are so small and insignificant that
the United Nations will sanction their incorporation into a larger, usu-
ally contiguous, state.83 The examples offered in support of this view
are India's absorption of Goa and the Moroccan incorporation of
Ifni.84 In neither case, however, did the United Nations expressly con-
demn these actions. Contrast this with East Timor where both the
Security Council and the General Assembly made it clear that East
Timor is not an enclave but instead contains a people entitled to a
right to self-determination. To suggest that East Timor belongs in this
historically obscure category is to engage in academic sophistry.
3. Historical Ties
85
Much the same can be said for historical ties. In Western Sa-
hara,86 the I.C.J. investigated the existence of historical ties, but even
after having found such ties the Court did not think they were of much
TIONAL LAW CONFERENCE ON THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80, at 7.
83. There is a further argument to the effect that East Timor is too small to be an
independent state and furthermore lacks economic viability. The first limb of this argu-
ment is based on an erroneous reading of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States (1933), which establishes a definition of statehood that includes "the capac-
ity to enter into relations with other states" (article 1(d)). Provided that East Timor has
independence and an effective government, it will, according to principles of customary
international law, possess sufficient capacity to meet the requirements of statehood. The
absence of recognition in 1975 after the Declaration of Independence by the East Timorese
Fretlin Government was a product of the perception that the Timorese lacked a govern-
ment in effective control of the territory. In any event, East Timor is larger and more
economically viable-especially if the hydrocarbon reserves in the Timor Gap are taken
into account-than many existing states, e.g., Nauru (pop. 100,000), Micronesia, and San
Marino.
84. See Fonteyne, supra note 40, at 176.
85. The claims of the Indonesian government in this regard are outlined in Clark,
supra note 9, at 20-21.
86. Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 12.
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relevance to Western Sahara's right to self-determination. In East 77-
mor, the I.C.J. is likely to go a step further and find that East Timor's
historical ties to Indonesia are not only irrelevant but also negligible.?
Ultimately, it appears that East Timor's right to self-determination is
unassailable.
C. The Duties of Third Parties Toward Peoples Claiming a Right
to Self-Determination
Complications arise when the consequences of the right to self-
determination are considered. In particular, what are the rights and
duties of the relevant parties in this case, namely Portugal and Austra-
lia, and what is the likely impact of the absent third party, Indonesia,
on the proceedings?
Some of these issues relate to procedure and therefore fall
outside the scope of this Article. However, I will consider these
briefly in order to provide some sort of context for the substantive
discussions elsewhere and also because these touch on the status of
self-determination. First, there is the question of standing. Briefly,
Portugal must satisfy the Court that it has an actionable interest in this
case. In other words, Portugal must show that it has suffered some
violation of its rights as the administering power in East Timor or that
it has a legal interest independent of this relationship. The challenge
confronting Portugal here is to convince the Court that either Portu-
gal's status as administering power has survived almost two decades of
Indonesian rule or that any state within the world community can
bring this action on behalf of the East Ttmorese on the basis that the
principle of self-determination is a right erga omnes.Y The I.C.J.'s ju-
risprudence on both these issues is far from decisive. However, in the
first instance, the I.C.J. may simply accept the United Nations' deter-
mination that Portugal remains the administering power. This was the
view taken by the Court in the South West Africa cases, where South
Africa was considered the mandate power despite its claims to the
87. The absence of these ties is well-documented in TAYLOR, supra note 3.
88. A right erga omnes is one that is opposable to the entire international community.
Portugal argues on this basis that each member of that community has a right to bring an
action when such an obligation is not met and that such rights are opposable to any individ-
ual member of the world community breaching that duty. See Portuguese Application,
supra note 16, at 4; see also Barcelona Traction Power and Light Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970
LCJ. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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contrary and its physical and illegal occupation of Namibia in a capac-
ity other than that of an administering power.89
The jurisprudence of the Court is more ambiguous in the case of
a legal interest existing erga omnes. Is there an actio popularis in in-
ternational law? Again the South West Africa cases are a fruitful but
not dispositive source of jurisprudence. The majority in the 1962
South West Africa case (Admissibility Phase) accepted that such an
interest might exist. This view suffered a reversal in the 1966 decision,
where the Court held that "although a right [actio popularis] of this
kind may be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not
known to international law as it stands at present."9 ° However, in
Barcelona Traction the majority referred to the existence in interna-
tional law of obligations erga omnes.91 More recent practice and com-
ment on this issue suggests that if such an action does exist then it can
be founded on the principle of self-determination. 92
Second, the International Court's competence to hear the case
depends on the notoriously complex question of absent or indispensa-
ble third parties.93 Generally, the Court, in common with most judi-
cial bodies, will not determine the merits of a case where such a
determination will compromise the rights and obligations of a third
party not present at the proceedings. Indonesia is the absent third
party here. Again, previous decisions of the Court provide only lim-
ited guidance, though there is an increasing tendency to allow such
cases to proceed on the merits.94 The question really becomes this:
Do Indonesia's legal interests "form the very subject matter of the
89. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21)
(preliminary objections).
90. South West Africa, 1966 I.CJ. 47, J 88.
91. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.CJ. 32.
92. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAv 473 (4th ed. 1990).
93. The reason that Australia and not Indonesia is the defendant in this case is that
Australia has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of the
statute of the I.C.J. Indonesia has not made such a declaration and thus cannot be brought
to the Court. See Christine Chinkin, Third Parties and International Litigation 55 (May
1991) (paper delivered at International Law Seminar in Canberra, on file with author); see
also lain Scobbie, The Presence of an Absent Third: Procedural Aspects of the East Timor
Case (Nov. 1992) (paper delivered at the Catholic Institute for International Relations and
the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor conference in London, on file with
author).
94. This trend can be traced from Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (Italy
v. Fr., U.K. and U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15) through to Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 39, and Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992
I.C.J. 345.
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decision that is applied for?"95 Applying the reasoning of the Court in
Certain Phosphate Lands to East Timor, one is tempted to conclude
that a majority of the Court is likely to come to the conclusion that
Indonesia's interests do not prevent the Court from deciding the
case.
9 6
Assuming, then, that Portugal establishes both standing and com-
petence and satisfies the Court that the East Timorese right to self-
determination has not been qualified out of existence, it will still be
left with the problem of showing that Australia has failed to meet its
duties and responsibilities to the East Timorese, Portugal, or both. In
this matter, at least, the Court will be breaking relatively new ground.
Portugal asserts that Australia, by entering into the Timor Gap Treaty
and recognizing Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, has
breached at least three separate duties. First, Australia has failed to
observe its obligations towards Portugal as administering power over
East Timor. In contravention of this obligation it has entered into a
treaty with Indonesia over resources administered by Portugal?7 See-
ond, Australia has ignored its duty to withhold recognition of illegal
situations by recognizing Indonesia's illegal annexation of East Timor.
Third, Australia has failed to respect the East T'imorese right to self-
determination.
First, assuming that the Court accepts Portugal's continuing status
as the administering power, then Australia would appear to have
breached a fundamental norm of international law and, indeed, inter-
national relations by negotiating a treaty with the wrong party. Sec-
ond, it has both breached Portugal's rights and failed to meet its own
obligations by recognizing Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Ti-
mor. This duty of non-recognition of territory acquired by force is
enshrined in international law in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Re-
lations and in the 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution
95. Phosphate Lands Judgment on the Preliminary Objcctions, supra, note 24, at 9.
96. See id. at 3-9. The majority held that Australia's rights and duties as joint adminis-
tering power over Nauru could be determined in the absence of the other joint-administer-
ing powers, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Id. at 9. The position of New Zealand
and the United Kingdom is much closer to that of Australia in this case than is Indonesia's
to that of Australia in the East Tumor dispute.
97. Portugal also argues in its application that Australia "contravened a general obli-
gation to negotiate with the competent State on matters of common interest and the sp2-
cific obligation to negotiate with that State on questions relating to the maritime areas of
direct concern to East Timor." See Portuguese Application, supra note 16, at 3.
98. Id. 5.
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on Aggression.9 The I.C.J. itself restated that obligation in the
Namibia Advisory Opinion, in which it found that states were under
an obligation not to recognize South Africa's illegal occupation of
Namibia.1°°
Finally, Australia has breached its duty not to prejudice or im-
pede the exercise of a right to self-determination. This is a right Aus-
tralia was obliged to promote and respect according to several U.N.
Security Council resolutions and a number of U.N. instruments on the
right to self-determination. 10 1 Instead, Australia has entered into a
treaty that will have the effect of denying a unit of self-determination
the economic means necessary to exercise self-determination.
The balance of customary international law, then, clearly favors
the Portuguese position. 1°2 Australia's actions, while perhaps defensi-
ble as a policy in furtherance of national self-interest, remain at odds
with international law.'0 3 The prohibition on the use of force and the
right to self-determination are foundational doctrines of the interna-
tional legal regime.1°4 Australia's disregard for these principles, indi-
rect as it may have been, nevertheless contributes to the weakening of
these principles and undermines the efficacy of the rule of law in inter-
national affairs. The I.C.J., dedicated as it must be to the maintenance
of legality in the international order, is unlikely to be convinced by
99. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 49; G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
100. Namibia Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16.
101. G.A. Res. 3485, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 34140, supra note 8; G.A. Res. 37/30, supra
note 8; S.C. Res. 384, supra note 7; S.C. Res. 389, supra note 7.
102. If the right to self-determination does not create obligations for third parties, one
wonders what force the principle has? Apart from the arguments on the basis of a breach
of U.N. Charter, article 2, paragraph 4, there were also suggestions that Kuwait's right to
self-determination gave rise to a duty on the part of the international community to come
to its aid militarily. If this is the case, then surely one must infer that even a minimalist
reading of the right demands of third party states that they do nothing to infringe or im-
pede exercise of that right.
103. The Australians argue that by recognizing Indonesia's sovereign authority over
East Timor they can better advance the interests of the East Timorese in "a more construc-
tive and effective manner than would otherwise have been the case." Letter from the Hon.
Stephen Martin on behalf of Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, to Gerry J. Simp-
son, Law Faculty, Univ. of Melbourne (May 25, 1992) (on file with author). As far as the
Timor Gap Treaty is concerned, Australia has argued that the conclusion of the treaty
brings Indonesia and Australia into closer relations with each other and places Australia in
a better position to influence Indonesian policy on East Timor. It further argues that Aus-
tralia has important security interests in maintaining well-defined sea boundaries and has
an economic duty to the Australian people to exploit resources that will benefit the popula-
tion. See Australian Government Responses to Frequently Raised Issues Regarding East
Timor, May 5, 1992 (on file with author).
104. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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arguments derived from political expediency or the claim to exercise
unfettered sovereign authority. Indeed, of all the obstacles facing Por-
tugal in this case, it is the substantive barriers that pose the fewest
difficulties. Success in the procedural arguments relating to standing
and competence provide grounds for some optimism when the Court
comes to consider these substantive issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Realistically, even if this optimism is converted into an I.C.J.
judgment that finds favor in Lisbon, such a judgment alone is unlikely
to transform the lives of the residents of Dili, the capital of East Ti-
mor. The Court's capacity to modify the strategic interests of the ma-
jor world powers is negligible."5 Eighteen years have elapsed since
the Court handed down its Western Sahara decision, confirming the
rights of the Western Saharan people to self-determination, and still
there is little prospect of resolution there.
Nevertheless, a defeat for Portugal in this case will be potentially
traumatic for the East Timorese. Indonesia is likely to seize on such
an outcome as a vindication of its policies in East Tunor over the past
eighteen years. This will occur regardless of whether the Court de-
cides the case on the procedural issues or on the merits. Conversely, a
judgment that affirms East T'mor's right to self-determination will
provide the East Timorese with an immense fillip in their struggle for
independence and should add significant judicial weight to those ele-
ments of world public opinion supporting liberty for East Timor. At
present, East T'morese cultural life is dying by degrees.10 A positive
outcome in this case, coupled with heightened awareness of the plight
of the East Tmorese people affected by the events described at the
beginning of this Article, could signal the salvation of East Timorese
national and cultural identity. The Court may at the same time find
itself instrumental in reviving the moribund principle of self-determi-
nation in international law.
105. However, the Court no doubt can cause those states acute embarrassment.
106. Apart from the overt consequences of repression, there is also the problem of
population transfer and "ethnic dilution." It is estimated that by late 1991 there %%ere ap-
proximately 100,000 non-indigenous persons in East Timor out of a total population of
755,950. See Herb Feith, East 7Tunor The Opening Up, the Crackdown and the Fossibihq
of a Durable Settlement, in INorNSN AssEssm.=r 1992: PoLImcAL PFPr' Pa'nYIVE r.
THE 1990s 65 (Harold Crouch & Hal Hill eds., 1992).
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